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Pope and Schweitzer (AER, 2011) study predictions of prospect theory for the reference
point of par on the current hole in professional golf. We study prospect theory predictions
for three other plausible reference points: par for recent holes, for the round, and for
the tournament. A potentially competing force is momentum in quality of play, i.e., the
hot or cold hand. While prospect theory predicts negative serial correlation in better
(worse)-than-average performance across holes, the hot (cold) hand implies the opposite.
We find evidence that, for each of the reference points we study, when scores are better
than par, hot hand effects are dominated by prospect theory effects. These effects can
occur via two mechanisms, greater conservatism or less effort; we find evidence that the
former (latter) dominates for scores closer to (further from) the reference point. We also
find evidence of prospect theory effects (greater risk-seeking) when scores are worse than
par for the round in Round 1, and of cold hand effects for scores worse than par for the
tournament in Round 3. The magnitudes of some of the joint effects are comparable to
those found by Pope and Schweitzer and other related papers. We conclude by discussing
how, rather than compete, prospect theory and cold hand forces might also cause one
another.
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“You get to like the 12th hole and I’m three under par and I don’t want to have one hole hurt
a round so I end up laying up”
–Phil Mickelson, in an interview after the first round of the 2015 US Open1
1 Introduction
Pope and Schweitzer (2011) (hereafter PS) find that professional golfers make putts for a
score of par around three percentage points more often than putts of the same difficulty for
a score one stroke better than par (birdie). Since nearly all strokes have roughly the same
expected effect on final tournament standing and earnings, golfers should, normatively, treat
otherwise equivalent par and birdie putts equally, and thus perform equally well on them.
PS’s finding violates this normative standard, but is consistent with predictions of prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)): that individuals are often influenced by arbitrary
reference points, in this case par for the current hole, and have greater motivation to avoid a
loss versus the reference point than to attain a gain. While prospect theory had been studied
extensively in the lab, PS’s paper was one of the first to study the topic in a context with
experienced decision-makers and high stakes.
In this paper, we develop the analysis of PS further by studying three other types of
reference points: par for very recent holes (the combined score for the current and last holes),
par for the current round, and par for the tournament. The Phil Mickelson quote above reflects
prospect-theory-type thinking with respect to the round-level reference point in particular, but
the others we analyze are plausible a priori as well.
Our analysis of reference points is motivated by several goals. First, we hope our results
contribute to the literature on the determinants of reference points that most affect behavior.
As discussed in Barberis (2013) (an excellent review of the elements of prospect theory and
follow-up theoretical and empirical work), one of the challenges in applying prospect theory
has been that the reference point’s definition is often ambiguous. In fact, our paper is the
first that we are aware of that studies the relevance of multiple reference points in a given
context. Second, we dig deeper into the possible mechanisms underlying reference-point effects,
effort versus risk attitudes. PS discuss both of these mechanisms driving their results–that
1From video on http://www.foxsports.com/golf/usga/story/us-open-phil-mickelson-1-under-69-first-round-
061815?vid=467701827998.
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players may exert more effort and/or become more risk-seeking in putts for par, causing the
improvement in average performance. But PS do not analyze which factor is dominant, or
how this may depend on context. Third, we hope to enhance understanding of the general
prevalence and magnitudes of prospect-theory effects.
This analysis is made more complex, however, by the fact that golfers may experience
periods of momentum in quality of play. That is, being in what prospect theory refers to as
“the domain of gains” (a position preferred to the reference point, i.e., having a score below par
for holes relevant to a given reference point) could be indicative of the golfer having the “hot
hand” and therefore being likely to play better on subsequent holes. The “domain of losses” (a
score above par) is analogous and may imply a “cold hand.” While the conventional wisdom
in behavioral economics as of just a few years ago was that “the hot hand is a widespread
cognitive illusion” (Kahneman (2011)), the hot hand is now recognized to exist in a variety of
settings.2 Hot (cold) hand theories predict positive serial correlation in the chance of outcomes
being better (worse) than average, and prospect theory typically predicts the opposite. The
hot hand—or the hot hand bias, i.e. over-estimation of one’s own momentum—could thus be
viewed as a confound to the analysis of prospect theory. But the hot and cold hands, and the
bias, are of interest also.3 Thus, while most of our results do not purely capture either prospect
theory or momentum effects, they instead can be viewed as the outcome of a potential horse
race between these competing forces. We do conduct a limited analysis in which the two types
of effects are better separated; the results from this support our interpretation of the results
from the main analysis.
Our main findings are as follows. For each of the three types of reference points, we find
evidence that when in the domain of gains, prospect theory effects dominate hot hand effects:
recent success predicts a decline in quality of subsequent performance. The evidence on effort
versus risk mechanisms is somewhat murky, but overall the results suggest that the prospect
theory effects are driven more by risk aversion when scores are closer to the reference point,
2See Iso-Ahola and Dotson (2014) for a good recent review. An (even more recent) paper omitted is
Miller and Sanjurjo (2014), who emphasize the important distinction between hot and cold hands and present
striking new experimental results. Arkes (2015) found evidence of the cold hand in golf across rounds, but no
evidence of a hot hand. However, Stone (2012) and Arkes (2013) both show that typical tests of the hot/cold
hand have low power and may be biased toward null effects. It is important to note that the bias to infer
the hot hand prematurely (Falk and Konold (1997); a.k.a. the ‘hot hand bias’) is still well established and
unquestioned.
3See, for example, Arkes and Stone (2014) for discussion of psychological and economic implications.
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and more by lower effort for scores further from the reference point. There is some evidence of
a hot hand bias (that golfers become overconfident), which could also account for this decline
in performance in the domain of gains.
We also find several types of evidence indicating that the actual reference points golfers
use are influenced by both salience and expectations: that players adjust expectations, and
thus reference points, based on their own overall ability, how play is going in a particular
round, and the difficulty of the relevant holes. Since these factors diminish the observability
of reference point effects, these results imply our more aggregated results are, in general, likely
attenuated.
When golfers enter a hole in the domain of losses, results are different. We find some
evidence of greater risk-seeking behavior (as predicted by prospect theory), as being in the
domain of losses for the round in Round 1 is associated with greater chances of both below-
and above-par scores on the current hole. We also find a general decline in quality of play
when scores are above par for the tournament in Round 3, consistent with the cold hand (we
restrict analysis to Rounds 1 and 3 for reasons we explain in Section 4.3). This effect occurs
for both relatively high and low ranked players, indicating it is not just driven by lack of
experience, skill or lower stakes. While the exact mechanism behind the effect is somewhat
unclear, the stronger result in Round 3 indicates it is unlikely to be caused entirely by a few
plausible alternative factors we discuss.
We also estimate the joint effects of the reference points across sets of holes (rounds and
half-rounds). Our estimates for these joint effects are precise and mostly small (less than 0.1
strokes) for round-level effects. However, the joint effect for all of Round 3 starting with a
tournament score substantially above or below par is around 0.2 strokes, which is similar to
the round-level effects found by PS, Brown (2011), and Kali, Pastoriza, and Plante (2015).
PS discuss how such a magnitude extrapolated for an entire tournament could imply annual
losses of hundreds of thousands of dollars. Some of our estimated half-round effects are larger
on a per-hole basis, and all of these estimates should be conservative due to the attenuation
issue, and so while these estimates are certainly not huge, they seem economically significant.
In summary, our results confirm the importance of reference points in real-world behav-
ior, as their effects are large enough to be observable and substantial despite heterogeneity,
unobserved expectations and competing forces. Our results also provide evidence consistent
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with the existence and importance of momentum in performance and the asymmetry of hot
and cold momentum. In the final section we discuss reconciling our seemingly inconsistent
results—the variation in dominance of risk, effort, and cold hand effects. Rather than being
competing forces, cold hand and prospect theory effects may actually, at least in part, cause
one another.
2 Data and prior literature
2.1 Context and Data
We briefly review the rules of golf. Golf is an individual sport in which players compete in
tournaments. Each tournament consists of four rounds of 18 holes, one round per day, on
consecutive days. The initial field typically has 132, 144, or 156 players. After two rounds,
around 70 players (depending on ties) typically “make the cut” and continue playing through
the final two rounds over the weekend. Each round has 18 holes. Each hole has a par value
of three, four, or five strokes, which is typically thought of as the expected number of strokes
for a professional player to complete the hole, and is indeed typically the hole’s median and
modal score. There are several standard terms for non-par scores: eagle means two under par,
birdie one under par, and a (double) bogey is one (two) over par.
There are three main categories of shots; drives (only taken on par 4 and par 5 holes),
approach shots (the first shot on a par 3 hole, and the second (and sometimes later) shots
on par 4 and 5 holes), and putts, taken from the “green” (the area with very short grass
surrounding the hole). The objective for drives is to advance further and to land on the
“fairway,” the area in the middle of the path from the start to end of the hole with relatively
short grass, which is easier to take approach shots from than the “rough” (area with longer
grass outside the fairway). The objective for approach shots is to minimize the number of
subsequent putts, and for putts, both to make the shot and/or to set up an easier subsequent
shot. The hole’s difficulty varies from round to round within a tournament both due to
changing weather and the location of the hole on the green varying across rounds.
We use data from the PGA’s ShotLink database, available to the public online. The
database includes information on every shot at PGA tournaments events from 2003 through
the present, excluding the four major tournaments. We use data through the 2014 season.
Variables include the tournament, course, round, hole, player, the score on the given hole,
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and, based on laser-determined location, the location of the ball and distance to the hole for
each shot.
The unit of observation used for our analysis is player-year-tournament-round-hole. We
start with 3,549,186 observations. We deleted 627 rounds that were labeled the 5th round
(which occurs rarely in certain tournaments), and dropped 109 rounds for which there were
missing scores. We considered dropping the five tournaments that comprise the golf play-offs,
the FedEx Cup (the Tour Championships, Deutsche Bank Championship, The Barclays, and
the BMW Championship), but found results were similar and prefer to keep these observations
to maximize sample size. We code hole number in the order in which holes are played by the
player, so if a player played holes 10-18 before 1-9 in a round, which happens somewhat
regularly, hole 10 is coded for that player-round as hole 1, hole 11 as 2, etc.
2.2 Related literature
PS is the most closely related prior paper. Other papers that analyze prospect theory in
golf are Sachau, Simmering, and Adler (2012) and McFall (2015). The former finds that,
consistent with prospect theory, amateur golfers are more risk-seeking after a bogey, versus
after a par or birdie. In addition to analyzing the behavior of amateurs and not pros, their
paper also differs from ours by using survey data and not data on performance. The latter
finds that PGA players penalized a shot for hitting a par-5 tee shot out of bounds are more
likely to “go for the green” on the shot after the do-over drive, indicating more risk-seeking
behavior. This finding supports the importance of par on the current hole as a reference point,
consistent with PS.
Other economics papers using PGA Tour data include the following. Brown (2011) finds
that the presence of Tiger Woods de-motivated other top players (who otherwise would have
been more likely to win the championship), causing them to perform worse by 0.8 strokes
per tournament. Kali, Pastoriza, and Plante (2015) study the effects of non-monetary incen-
tives on performance and find that players perform worse when these incentives (Ryder Cup
points) are higher. They find effects that range from 0.29 to 0.81 strokes per tournament.
Rosenqvist and Skans (forthcoming) is similar to our paper in that they study the effects of
confidence, closely related to the hot/cold hand, and indeed find evidence of positive corre-
lation in performance; their paper differs from ours in their focus on performance variation
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across, and not within, tournaments.
Other papers in this genre differ from ours by analyzing effects for specific holes or small sets
of holes, and not entire rounds of play. Hickman and Metz (2015) show that players choke on
putts on the final holes of tournaments when monetary stakes are higher, and Balsdon (2013)
show that risk strategies are affected by tournament standing, more so when players are trying
to make the cut rather than at the end of tournaments. Ozbeklik and Smith (2014) show that
risk strategies do vary with tournaments but only analyze match play (a non-standard format
of tournament); as the authors discuss, the incentives to change risk strategy are much stronger
in the match play format, which supports our assumption that risk attitudes, normatively,
should not change for the large majority of holes we analyze.
3 Theory and Identification
Prospect theory predicts that decisions are made based on salient changes or differences in a
variable of interest, as compared to the so-called reference point, which is a psychologically
plausible baseline, typically arbitrary from a normative perspective. By contrast, standard
economics of course assumes choices are made based on levels of relevant variables. For
example, if proposed a “50-50 win $150, lose $100 gamble,” prospect theory assumes agents
make choices ignoring the value of their initial wealth, since this is the natural reference point.
The same choice is thus made whether initial wealth is $100 or $1 million. Obviously, this
factor could be normatively significant.
Prospect theory includes three other key elements, in addition to reference points: 1) agents
evaluate a “value” (contra utility) function of outcomes versus the reference point, whose slope
is two to three times as steep in the domain of losses (negative values of the difference/change
variable) versus that of gains (positive values), implying loss aversion; 2) there are diminishing
marginal effects of both gains and losses on the value function; 3) “probability weighting,”
in particular, very low probabilities are weighted upward in calculating expectations. Since
most of the decisions we analyze do not involve very low probabilities, and in the interest of
parsimony, we do not consider probability weighting in our analysis (however, this may be
worth studying in future work).
We present an illustrative value function, applied to the context of golf for the reference
points that we consider, in Figure 1. Discussion of this figure is sufficient for understanding
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the key forces at play in our empirical setting; a detailed formal analysis, which could include
dynamic effects across holes, is beyond our scope. Note that, for now, scores below par are
gains and thus imply positive values of x (score relative to par for a given reference point),
and vice versa for scores above par. For the moment, assume that x represents the score on
just the current hole being played. The value function is steeper in the domain of losses due
to loss aversion, which implies the return to making a shot to avoid a loss (x = −1) is greater
than the return to attaining a gain of the same size (x = 1). PS pointed out that this could
cause golfers to put more effort into putts for par than for birdie (x = 1), and focus on this
explanation for their result that par putts are indeed made more often. Effort, in this context,
refers to time and focus, which does plausibly vary at least to some extent from hole to hole.
The figure also shows that, since the value function is convex to the left and concave to
the right, golfers may be more risk-seeking for shots to avoid losses (or further losses), and
more risk-averse on shots to attain gains. And indeed, PS also found evidence indicating that
birdie putts were more conservative, as they were left short of the hole more often than those
for par.
As discussed above, our work is motivated, first and foremost, by the existence of several
other plausible reference points in golf, beyond par on the current hole. When a golfer steps up
to the tee, he is not in the domain of gains or losses for that particular hole. If he performed
well on the previous hole, he might still feel the emotional benefit from the gain and thus
continue to act as if he is in the domain of gains. And he might also consider score relative
to par for the round and/or for the tournament, since this information is likely available and
salient. That is, x could represent the combined score from the current hole and any of a few
different sets of relevant previous holes.
If x > 0 (in the domain of gains, i.e. below par) at the start of a hole, this could make
the golfer exert less effort than otherwise, since the returns to further gains and costs of losses
are both relatively low. This would make him less likely to attain birdie, more likely to attain
bogey, and have a higher mean score on the current hole. At the same time, x > 0 could also
cause conservatism due to the concavity of the value function (making the golfer less likely
to attain both birdie and bogey, possibly also increasing mean score). If x < 0, the value
function is convex and steep, which would cause relatively high risk-seeking and/or effort.4
4Admittedly it is unclear from the figure whether the value function is ‘more concave’ when x > 0 versus
x = 0, or ‘steeper’ when x < 0 versus x = 0, i.e. some predictions could depend on the parameterization of
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x = -score relative to reference point (positive values = scores below par)










Start hole in domain of losses:
Convex value function.
Highest returns to effort.
Start hole in domain of gains:  
Concave value function.  
Lowest returns to effort.
Start hole at reference pt:
Convex-concave value function.
Moderate returns to effort.
Figure 1: A prospect theory value function for golfers (v(x) = x0.7 if x ≥ 0, = −2.3(−x)0.7 if
x < 0).
However, performance versus each of these reference points could also be a proxy for the
extent to which a player is currently hot or cold. If a player performed better than par on the
last hole, his ability level might be temporarily elevated (due to confidence, physical factors,
etc.), implying he is likely to perform better on the current hole as well (higher chance of
birdie, lower chance of a bogey, lower mean score). The reverse would be true for players who
performed poorly on recent holes. We note that results consistent with the cold hand could
be caused by injuries or other physical problems.
Table 1 summarizes the predicted effects for various outcomes for the different forces. Since
each of the three—hot/cold hands, effort, and risk preferences—makes a unique prediction for
the value function and/or level of x. Moreover, since the value function flattens to both the left and right,
returns to effort could decrease as x declines for x < 0. These returns could also increase if golfers consider the
effects of current and future holes on the value function when deciding on how to approach the current shot.
For example, if a golfer begins a hole at x = −2, his benefit of a birdie and moving to x = −1 is less than
that of a birdie pushing him from x = −1 to x = 0, suggesting his effort incentive when starting at x = −2 is
lower than at x = −1. However, if he also thinks about the potential future benefit of moving from x = −1
to x = 0, he might be more motivated at x = −2 than x = −1. In summary, prospect theory predictions are
somewhat ambiguous, but the ones we discuss are those we feel are most plausible, a priori, and are consistent
with previous literature. Moreover, some of our empirical analysis is flexible and allows for varying effects,
and we also discuss different types of effects in Section 7.
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the combination of three types of outcomes (above par, below par, and mean performance),
we can, loosely speaking, identify which of the three forces is dominant, by examining effects
of position versus the reference point for each of the three outcomes.5 We discuss the methods
we use for estimating these effects in the next section.
[Table 1]
4 Empirical methods
4.1 Left-hand side (LHS) variables
To test these predictions, it might be ideal to estimate a model that jointly analyzes more
than one of the outcomes, such as multinomial logit (ordered logit would not be appropriate
since the signs of the predicted effects are ambiguous). However, a non-linear model like this
is computationally infeasible given the size of our data set and the need to include large sets
of fixed effects. Instead, we use linear probability models for each of the probability outcomes
(bp, ap, binary variables for below and above par on the current hole, respectively), and a
linear model also for the outcome of score (s).
4.2 Right-hand side (RHS) variables
To capture effects of par for the round and tournament as reference points, we include, in all
regressions, shots above par for the current round, rounda, shots below par for round, roundb,
shots above par for the current tournament, tourna, and shots below par for tournament,
tournb. Each of these variables thus takes a value of zero or a positive integer. While we focus
on linear specifications, we also examine non-linear models to examine how marginal effects
and mechanisms may change.
To capture effects of score versus par for the last hole (to address the reference point of
par for the rolling pair of the current and last holes), we include, in all regressions, lastb, lasta
(strokes below and above par on the last hole, respectively). These variables are again weakly
5We write “+ or 0” for the effect of an increase in conservatism on average score because while the chances
of extreme outcomes should clearly decline, and this may be associated with an increase in average scores,
it is also possible that average scores could be unaffected. But it seems reasonable to rule out the case of
conservatism causing average scores to decline. We write “?” for the analogous increase in aggressiveness
because this could plausibly increase or decrease mean score (decrease if golfers were previously failing to
minimize score in order to avoid too much risk; increase if golfers sacrifice mean score for a chance of making
big gains).
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positive and integer-valued. We explored including analogous variables for the last two and
last three holes, but they do not qualitatively change the results, and make the results harder
to interpret and the presentation much more complex.
We include the last, round, and tourn variables in all models because they are obviously
correlated and act as controls for one another, and it would be difficult to interpret results with
these variables included in separate models. A natural alternative specification would be to
include the scores for individual lagged holes as separate regressors. We think our specification
is preferable because it maps directly to reference point theory. It would be very difficult to
interpret round and tournament reference point effects with a lagged hole score specification.
However, one should note that our specification does imply that, in general, the coefficients
cannot be interpreted as marginal effects, and it is more appropriate to consider the joint
marginal effects over a set of holes such as a round, as we discuss in Section 6.
4.3 Other controls
In addition to the last/round/tourn variables acting as controls for one another, there are
many factors that could confound our analysis. An important one is tournament standing. In
certain situations (towards the end of Rounds 2 and 4 especially) players may have strategic
incentives to go for riskier or more conservative shots, and these incentives could be correlated
with our regressors of interest. Controlling for these incentives is very difficult, and could
create a “bad control” problem, since standing at the start of a hole would be affected by the
regressors of interest. Thus, we limit our analysis to the rounds in which strategic incentives
such as these should be minimal, Rounds 1 and 3. Since we have such a large sample we
can still obtain precise results for this limited scope. Note that these rounds are not studied
by Hickman and Metz (2015) and Balsdon (2013), who study strategic tournament payoff
effects–which corroborates our assumption that these strategic incentives should be negligible
in Rounds 1 and 3. Moreover, in auxiliary analysis reported in Appendix Tables 8-9, we show
that results for Rounds 1 and 2 are similar, as are those of Rounds 3 and 4.
Other important confounding variables are player and course heterogeneity. Fixed effects
(FEs) are clearly the ideal way to control for these factors. We include FEs for each hole-
day, which accounts for variation in difficulty of courses, holes within courses, placement of
the pin and weather across rounds (we cannot control for weather changes within a round).
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Accounting for player heterogeneity is more difficult. We consider several types of FEs: player-
year, player-year-par value, player year and player-par value combined, and player-course.6
Each of these, except the latter, accounts for player ability changing over time; player-course-
year FEs would be equivalent to player-tournament FEs, which would be very collinear with
the tourn variables. Accounting for par value is important since some players may be relatively
good at longer or shorter holes, and par values are not independent across holes.
Including any of these FEs could cause a dynamic panel endogeneity bias, a.k.a. Nickell
bias (Nickell (1981)). The lagged dependent variable is endogenous in fixed effects panel data
models, and the last/round/tourn variables are highly correlated with the lagged dependent
variable.7 A standard way to address this problem is to use other lags as instruments (e.g.,
the Arellano-Bond estimator), but we cannot do this since we do not know which, if any,
lags are exogenous. However, the bias caused by this endogeneity problem disappears as T
grows large.8 Thus, we can address this issue by dropping FE groups with insufficiently large
T (number of observations per fixed-effect group). We determine what cut-off to use for T
empirically. We do this by checking results for each type of FEs with progressively higher
(minimum) T thresholds. If results change substantially from one threshold to another, this
means the results for the lower threshold are very likely biased. If results are similar across
thresholds, this means the bias has likely become small.
We report a large set of these results in Appendix Tables 1-7, but only summarize these
results here in the interest of brevity. We find the Nickell bias is severe for player-course FEs, as
results change sharply as the threshold grows until a large majority of the sample is lost. But
the bias appears fairly mild for other FEs; results are roughly stable for a range of thresholds
that maintain the large majority of the sample. Using our best judgment, we choose to proceed
using player-year-par FEs with a threshold of 50 observations per FE group. These FEs are
more conservative than both player-year and the player-year, player-par combination (since
player-year-par allows player ability to vary by par-value across years), but more aggressive
6We use the procedure developed in Correia (2014) to account for the high dimensionality of the FEs.
7For intuition, consider a situation in which each player only played two holes. If the player-level mean
was controlled for, then lastb would mechanically be highly negatively correlated with s2. E.g., if a player
shot par on average, the coefficient on lastb would be minus one and the coefficient on lasta plus one, for
a dependent variable of s2. The bias referred to by Miller and Sanjurjo (2014), and studied explicitly by
Miller, Sanjurjo, et al. (2015), is very similar, as shown in Appendix B.3 of the latter paper, which refers to
the analogous non-panel case. Note that this bias is not caused by time effects (in our context, hole-day
effects), since for these FE groups the lagged regressor is not in the same group as the current observation.
8See, for example, Flannery and Hankins (2013).
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than player-year-par with higher thresholds, which lead to substantial sample losses (over 30%
for a threshold of 100) but largely similar results. Still, we should keep in mind that we do
not control for player-course effects.
The final (baseline) regression equation we use is thus:
yih = β1lastbih + β2lastaih + β3roundbih + β4roundaih + β5tournbih + β6tournaih + αi + γh + ϵih. (1)
The subscript i denotes the player-year-par FE group, and h denotes the course-hole-day FE
group. The dependent variable, y, is below-par (bp, 0/1), above-par (ap, 0/1), or the score (s,
1, 2, ...). Standard errors are clustered by player-tournament. Summary statistics for our final
sample, and variable definitions, are provided in Table 2. Scores tend to be better for last





Table 3 presents the various results for the baseline model. We interpret these results using
the predictions of Table 1, and focus our discussion on the significant results. We do not
present tests of joint significance for any of the variables because joint effects are analyzed in
Section 6. We first discuss the variables measuring gains, and then those for losses.
All five of the variables increasing in gains versus reference points (lastb, roundb, tournb,
with the first two included in the models for both Rounds 1 and 3) have significant negative
effects on the probability of scoring below par on the current hole. This is quite strong evidence
that prospect theory effects (effort and/or risk) dominate hot-hand effects for this outcome.
As players move further into the domain of gains for each reference point, they do not exert
as much effort or play more conservatively on subsequent holes.
9Scores for the last and round variables are relatively low compared to the mean of s in Round 3 because a
relatively high number of Par 5 observations are dropped from the final sample in Round 3 (but not from the
construction of last and round variables), and scores on Par 5 holes are much lower on average than those of
Par 3 and 4 holes. We provide the minimum and maximum value for each variable, rather than the standard
deviation, because the latter provides less immediate information both on how the variable is defined and the
range of values it takes.
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In Round 3, an increase in lastb is also associated with a lower probability of scoring above
par on the current hole. This result, together with the lower probability of birdie, is consistent
with the prospect theory risk prediction: that golfers become more conservative when they
have gains they wish to preserve, and obtain diminished marginal value from further gains.
The evidence for a lower above-par probability in the domain of gains is insignificant for the
other gains variables, but usually directionally consistent with conservatism.
Turning to the outcome of average score, three of the five gains variables have significant
positive coefficients, and there are no significant negative ones. The positive sign is consistent
with both (prospect theory) risk and effort predictions, and inconsistent with the hot hand
prediction.
In the domain of losses, three of the five variables have significant positive effects on the
probability of scoring above par on the current hole: lasta, rounda in the first round and
tourna in Round 3. There are no significant negative effects for this outcome. In Round 1,
being above par for the round also is associated with a higher probability of a score below
par. The combination of these two effects (higher chances of scores below and above par) is
consistent with the risk prediction (greater risk-seeking). In Round 3, tourna is also associated
with higher average scores (and no increase in the chance of birdie). The combination of effects
for this variable is most consistent with the cold hand. It is unlikely that this result is driven by
within (current) round weather changes, since tournament scores during Round 3 are mostly
based on performance in the previous two days. Player-course effects should affect performance
in both rounds in a similar way, so these effects likely do not explain the stronger cold hand
results in Round 3. It is possible that these results are influenced by injuries (or other factors),
but such factors likely should also cause similar results in Round 1. Therefore, we interpret
our results as implying that cold hand forces are at least relatively strong in Round 3 when
tournament scores are high.
[Table 3]
We explore these results further in several ways. First, we examine non-linear specifica-
tions. As discussed above, diminishing marginal sensitivity is an important part of prospect
theory. Thus, the benefit of an additional gain declines as scores fall further below par. But
this means the cost of an additional loss also declines. This could cause golfers to actually
reduce effort as scores rise above par (for the round or tournament). On the other hand, if
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golfers integrate the value they could receive by eliminating all of their losses, effort could
continue to grow as scores rise further above par. Moreover, changes in the curvature of the
value function at different values of x could cause changes in risk attitudes.
We use two non-linear specifications; first, a relatively flexible quadratic, allowing marginal
effects to grow, shrink or neither. These results are in Table 5. We again discuss gains variables
first, then losses. The roundb linear terms for outcomes bp and ap are both negative in Round
1, indicating risk effects that were less clear in Table 4. However, the squared term is positive
and significant at 10%, indicating that the ap (bogey) effect disappears as roundb increases.
Thus, the combination of these results implies risk (effort) effects are stronger for scores closer
to (further from) the reference point. Moreover, in Round 3 the roundb-squared term is
significantly positive for ap and s, further indicating that effort effects are relatively dominant
for higher values of roundb.
Regarding the domain of losses, for Round 1 the rounda-squared terms for the LHS vari-
ables ap and s are both positive, indicating the marginal cold-hand and/or risk effects grow as
a golfer moves further into the domain of losses, and that effort effects may be dominant for
scores just above par. That is, golfers may successfully “try harder” when scores are just above
par in Round 1, but this extra effort does not occur, or is less effective, as scores go further
over par. For Round 3, again there is no evidence of any type of increase in the chance of
birdie. The cold hand effect indicated by higher scores for the tournament increases as scores
grow, but the marginal effect declines (the tourna -squared terms are negative and significant
for outcomes of above par and average score).
Next, we examine a specification in which the RHS variables are recoded as dummies,
equal to one if the original regressors took strictly positive values. This of course is a much
less flexible specification, but is appropriate if golfers focus on whether or not they are in the
domain of gains or losses, and not “where” they are in either of these domains. These results
are presented in Table 6. There are some intriguing results here that did not emerge in Table
4. In particular, being below par for the round (roundbd = 1) decreases the chance of ap = 1
in Round 1, and does not increase the chance of ap = 1 in Round 3. These results differ
from analogous results for roundb reported in Tables 4-5. These new (Table 6) results are
more indicative of risk effects than effort effects. Since the Table 6 results are relatively highly
influenced by lower values of roundb, and the Tables 4-5 results more by higher values, this
15
comparison supports the conclusion that risk effects are stronger for lower values of roundb,
and effort effects stronger for higher values. For the domain of losses, the results are also
supportive of the interpretation of Table 5 discussed above.
[Table 5]
A potential critique of our analysis is that par is not always the most relevant reference
point; that players expect better scores on relatively easy holes, and worse scores for tougher
holes.10 Consequently, a bogey on a difficult hole may be perceived as a relatively small loss,
and a birdie on an easy hole a small gain. This theory of expectations-dependent reference
points was first developed formally by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006). PS analyze this theory in
their context and find support for it.
We conduct a similar analysis, subtracting the mean score for each hole-tournament-round
from each player’s score and then reconstruct the the last, round and tourn variables with
these difficulty-adjusted scores. The new variables are referred to as adjlast, adjround, and
adjtourn. For example, if a golfer birdied hole 1 in Round 1, but every golfer birdied that
hole, then adjlastb = 0 on hole 2, while lastb = 1. The results are in Table 6. The point
estimates are indeed generally a bit stronger than their analogs in Table 4, supporting the
theory, and largely consistent with the interpretation of the original results discussed above.
A difference worth noting is that adjroundb has a positive effect on ap (while roundb did not),
supporting the effort prediction for that situation.
[Table 6]
5.2 Hole and player heterogeneity
In order to better understand these results we disaggregate the sample in several ways. First,
we split it into “front nine” holes (first nine holes played in the current round, which sometimes
are the course’s holes 10-18) and “back nine” holes, and estimate the baseline models for each
of these subsamples.11 The results, in Table 7, indicate that lastb effects are larger on the
10We also consider a robustness check in which we focus on just the third round and split the sample into
two, players in the top half of their tournament at the start of the round and those out of the top half, to
assess effects of tournament standing. Results are largely similar for the two groups (and unreported in the
interest of brevity); the most interesting difference is that the lower half group plays better in every dimension
as rounda increases, providing evidence of effort effects in the domain of losses. Perhaps most importantly,
the results confirm that the cold hand effect in Round 3 associated with high tournament scores is not driven
by players rationally “giving up” due to being out of contention as the cold hand effects are similar for both
groups of players.
11Note that Nickell bias is likely more severe for this analysis since there will be player-year-par groups with
less than 50 observations.
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back nine, and roundb effects greater on the front nine. This is consistent with the idea that
score relative to par for the round could be especially salient early in the round, when one
has recently started from the reference point score of zero. Later in the round, golfers may
become accustomed to being below par and adjust their reference point (and focus more on
the most recent holes). Thus, this is additional evidence of expectations-adjusted reference
points. Table 8 results also indicate that cold-hand effects (for the round and tournament)
accelerate on the back nine.
[Table 7]
In Table 9, we present results for an analysis split by par value per hole. Effects are
generally stronger for the longer holes, consistent with effects compounding across shots. In
particular, in Round 3, the roundb and tourna positive effects on score increase for larger par
values. We might expect, apriori, the risk effects to be relatively “visible” for par 5 holes, as
this is the one par value for which players are faced with the concrete choice of whether to
risk “going for the green” on the second shot, which as referred to above is studied by McFall
(2015). And indeed, the rounda effects in Round 1, consistent with greater risk-seeking, are
strongest for par 5 holes. However, the separate par 5 analysis does not reveal changes in
other risk attitudes obscured by the more aggregated analysis.
[table 8]
We next split our sample by official world golf ranking (for the end of the prior calendar-
year), and present results in Table 10.12 Results are fairly similar for higher- and lower-
ranked players. Important differences are that roundb effects in Round 1, and tournb effects
in Round 3, are stronger for the worse-ranked players, consistent with worse-ranked players
having expectations-based reference points closer to par in Round 1 and for the tournament in
Round 3. However, we also find roundb effects for better-ranked players in Round 3. Perhaps
this is because, after making the cut, their initial expectations/goals have been met, and the
reference point of par for the current round becomes more relevant. The tourna cold hand
effects in Round 3 are similar for both groups of players.
[table 9]
12Ranking data were obtained from http://www.pgatour.com/stats/stat.186.html. The number of observa-
tions per player-year-par group is very similar for both higher and lower ranked players, so Nickell bias is not
a greater threat for either group.
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5.3 Drives, approaches and putts
As discussed in Section 2, there are three main types of golf shots: drives, approaches, and
putts. We analyze the effects of reference points on these different shots to gain further insight
into the various types of behavior.
For drives, we use two LHS variables: distance, and a dummy for whether or not the drive
landed on the fairway (0/1). Improvements in both distance and fairway accuracy would
indicate greater effort, while different signs for these effects would indicate a change in risk
attitude (longer drives and lower accuracy would indicate a riskier strategy, and vice versa for
a more conservative strategy). We exclude holes that have an average drive distance less than
260 yards, as these are likely holes in which drive distance is shortened by the layout of the
hole.
For approaches, we use a sample of the first shot on a given hole for which the ball is
between 100 and 200 yards from the hole and on the fairway. We examine three LHS variables,
average distance from the hole after the shot, a dummy for “close” distance (within 8 feet of
the hole), and another dummy, “far” (20 feet or more from the hole). Results are similar with
different cut-off values. These cutoff values defining close and far are based on the probability
of making a putt from a given distance: 8 feet is a cutoff for which anything closer has, on
average, a 50% or higher probability of having the putt made, while putts beyond 20 feet have
less than a 15% probability of being made. These three outcomes map to the three outcomes
used for the analysis of hole-level results, representing mean performance, and probabilities of
above- and below-average performance, respectively. We include a 7th-order polynomial for
distance from hole to account for difficulty of the shot.
For putts, we use a binary dependent variable (miss/make) and controls of: 7th-order
polynomial for distance and an interaction of distance groups and elevation decile; (own) putt
number for the hole; dummies for whether the putt is for eagle, birdie, bogey, or double-bogey-
or-greater. Our results for these variables, which are not reported, are similar to those of PS,
but slightly smaller in magnitude.13
13We obtain estimates of -0.033 and -0.019 for birdie effects for Rounds 1 and 3, respectively, versus -0.038
and -0.024, which PS reports in their Table 5. Results may differ both due to our using a slightly different
specification, and sample, both with respect to the time-frame and criteria for dropping observations. The
groups we use for the distance group-elevation decile interaction are: 0-5 feet, 5-10 feet, 10-15 feet, 15-30 feet,
30-45 feet, 45-60 feet, and > 60 feet. In PS’s baseline model (columns 1-3 of their Table 3) they do not control
for elevation, and in other models they control for elevation in a slightly different, but roughly equivalent, way
(FEs for regions of the green).
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These results are in Table 11. In general, results are stronger for drives and approaches,
indicating reference points based on scores from past holes are more important for initial shots
on the hole, and the reference point of par on the current hole is most important for the final
shots on the hole (putts), supporting the idea that more salient reference points have greater
impacts. lastb is associated with a shorter drive in both rounds, and lasta a longer drive in
Round 3. These results could all be evidence of risk or effort effects. In Round 3, being above
par for the round also leads to riskier (longer and less accurate) drives. Being below par for
the round in Round 3 leads to shorter drives and worse all-around approach shots, consistent
with effort effects.
Scores below par for the round in Round 1, and for the tournament in Round 3, are both
associated with riskier drives (longer distance, and lower accuracy). The combination of these
effects (greater risk but worse “quality”) is not consistent with any of the predictions from
Table 1. However, these effects could result from the hot hand bias, which would be that a
mis-perceived belief that one has the hot hand causes him to attempt “riskier” shots. These
same variables, lastb and tournb, are also associated with lower probabilities of making putts,
and (all-around) inferior approach shots in Round 3. Since our approach shot sample is limited
to shots taken from the fairway, this means the drive leading to the approach must have been
accurate. This suggests an interpretation of the results in which golfers who are playing well
for the tournament take aggressive drives, then “shirk” on the approach shot and perhaps the
putt as well (the putt effects could also be due to conservatism). This contrast in behavior
across types of shots for a given reference point effect is somewhat puzzling. Perhaps taking
aggressive drives is simply highly appealing or fun (there is a saying that you “drive for show,
putt for dough”). It is also possible that the decline in all-around performance on approach
shots and putts when in the domain of gains could be caused by the hot hand bias causing
golfers to exert less effort due to overconfidence.
[table 10]
In the final analysis of this section, we exploit the disaggregation of shots within a hole to
better separately identify momentum and prospect theory effects. We do this by controlling for
lagged performance for the particular shot type, in addition to the standard last/round/tourn
variables. The lagged shot type performance controls provide a relatively direct measure of
recent quality of play for that particular shot type, and should thus capture momentum effects
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in a more pure way. Consequently, the last/round/tourn should now more directly capture the
more decision-theoretic prospect theory effects. We conduct this analysis as a final extension
rather than as the primary analysis of the paper for two reasons. First, and foremost, we
are ultimately interested in total effects on scores. If the phenomena interact, exacerbate,
or mitigate one another with respect to these effects, so be it. The net effects are still most
important, and the hole-level score-based analysis implicitly addresses this bottom-line issue
of score effects most directly. Second, controlling for past performance for a particular shot
type opens up a new can of methodological worms. In fact, we limit this new analysis to just
one shot type, drives, since measuring past performance for other shot types is more difficult.
Despite these issues, however, we feel this additional analysis clarifies and complements the
main results.
We control for recent performance on drives in two ways: 1) with lagged distance (lagdist)
and fairway (lagfairway); 2) with a moving average of distance on the last three holes
(MAdist) and fairway accuracy on the last three holes (MAfairway), calculated using just
one or two values when they are the only ones available (for holes 2-3 of a round and when
one or more of the last three holes was a par 3 or dropped par 4 or 5). Results are in Table
12. We include the results for drives reproduced from Table 11 for ease of direct comparison.
The coefficients for the last/round/tourn variables with either type of lagged drive controls
are typically stronger and directionally the same as the original coefficients. This supports
the interpretations discussed above, in particular, the point that the estimated effects were
mitigated somewhat by countervailing momentum effects. Moreover, the coefficients for the
lagged drive performance variables are generally consistent with momentum. However, we
cannot tell to what extent they are driven by the hot versus cold hands.
[table 11]
6 Magnitudes
Thus far we have omitted discussion of the magnitudes of effects due to the complexity caused
by interactions and dynamic effects across holes. When a golfer gets, say, a bogey on one hole,
this certainly increases the value of lasta for the next hole, but may increase, decrease, or have
no effect on all of the round and tourn regressors. Moreover, the bogey also affects the values
of these regressors for future holes. In general, it is misleading to interpret the magnitude of
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any individual estimate alone as a marginal effect, and is more appropriate to estimate the
reference points’ joint effect for a larger set of holes, such as a round. Thus, in this section we
estimate the expected total score for various sets of holes, e.g. E[
∑18
i=1(si|s1, ..., si−1)] for the
expected total score for a particular round with reference point effects, and compare this to
the expected score under the null of i.i.d. scores across holes.
We use the following simulation-based procedure. For simplicity, and to be consistent with
the empirical models used for the LHS variables ap and bp in Section 5, we restrict score for
each hole to be either -1, 0, or 1. We assume Pr(s1 = 1) = 0.165 and Pr(s1 = −1) = 0.195,
the approximate empirical probabilities of scores below and above par on the first hole of a
tournament. Results are similar when we use small variants on these numbers. After drawing
s1 for Round 1 from this distribution, we then draw s2 with distribution Pr(s2 = 1) = ˆap2|s1
and Pr(s2 = −1) = ˆbp2|s1, where ˆap2|s1 and ˆbp2|s1 are calculated using the baseline results
(those reported in Table 4), replacing the FEs with the ‘unconditional’ bogey and birdie
probabilities, 0.165 and 0.195, respectively. The distributions for later holes are calculated in
the same way, conditioning on scores from all prior holes.14 We estimate effects for various
scenarios for all of Round 1, Round 3, and the back nine for each of those rounds (we only
analyze the back nine separately because only the back nine’s starting round score can vary).
This procedure yields a distribution across simulation runs of round or half round-level
effects for a given set of point estimates for the last/round/tourn coefficients. The mean of
this distribution should be an unbiased estimate of the expected (half) round-level joint effect
(of the last/round/ts variables). We find by “guess and check” that 100,000 simulation runs
are necessary to get the mean of this distribution to stabilize within 0.01 strokes across nearly
all simulation runs, and we therefore use this number of runs for this procedure.
This distribution across simulation runs is driven by randomness in hole-level score draws,
and does not yield a confidence interval for the round-level effect. To obtain such a confidence
interval, we need to use the estimated sampling distribution of the coefficient estimates. A
naive way to do this would be to just use lower and upper bounds of the (analogous) con-
fidence intervals for each of the coefficients, but this would ignore the joint distribution of
the coefficient estimates. Thus, instead we take draws from a multivariate normal distribu-
tion with means equal to the coefficient estimates, and covariance of the estimated covariance
14In the actual simulations, the predicted probabilities never fell outside of [0,1].
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matrix, at the start of each simulation. We conduct a different 100,000 run (half) round-
level simulation for each of these draws, storing each mean effect. We repeat this procedure
1,000 times, giving us a distribution of 1,000 estimates of (half) round-level effects reflecting
sampling uncertainty. We then use the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles from this distribution to
construct a 95% confidence interval for the average (half) round effect.
To summarize, the procedure for a round-level effect is as follows (the half-round procedure
is analogous):
1. Draw one coefficient vector from two multivariate normal distributions, one with pa-
rameters equal to the bp model estimates, and one using the ap model estimates;
2. Draw a score of -1, 0 or +1 for hole 1 using probabilities 0.195, 0.64, 0.165, respectively;
3. Use this score and coefficients from step 1 to calculate predicted probabilities for hole
2, ˆbp2|s1 and ˆap2|s1, and use these to draw a score for hole 2;
4. Continue this procedure for holes 3-18; sum scores for holes 1-18 to get a round score;
5. Repeat steps 2-4 100,000 times; store the mean to obtain a precise estimate of the mean
round score for the coefficients from step 1;
6. Repeat steps 1-5 1,000 times to obtain to obtain an estimated sampling distribution of
these mean round score. Use the mean of this distribution as the point estimate, and the 2.5th
and 97.5th percentiles as the 95% confidence interval, for the expected round-level score.
[table 12]
Results are presented in Table 13. We report the implied joint effects of reference points
compared to the null; these are equal to the differences between our estimated half round/round
scores and the corresponding expected scores under the null of i.i.d. scores across holes
(18*(0.165-0.195) = -0.54 strokes under par per round, and -0.27 per half-round).15 There
is only a small effect for Round 1, less than 0.1% of a typical score of around 70 strokes per
round, but the confidence interval is so small the effect is significant at the 5% level. This
interval is likely especially small due to the large sample for this analysis and negative covari-
ances of many of the coefficient estimates. Results on the back nine, however, are larger; a
nearly significant effect of 0.044 strokes when starting the back nine five strokes below par,
and a significant effect of 0.104 strokes when starting five strokes above par. Prospect theory
causes golfers to “take it easy” and/or “play it safe” to protect gains after starting the round
15In unreported results we compare the entire distributions of scores, and not just the means, and find
results are similar.
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well, both of which cause performance to decline on the back nine; the cold hand/risk-seeking
causes a larger effect, though performance on the back nine is still much better than the
assumed front nine performance.
For Round 3, the results are stronger, both for the back nine and for the entire round,
especially when the tournament score at the start of the round is non-zero. Round-level effects
are higher (worse) scores of 0.09 (starting at par), 0.17 (starting five under), and 0.23 strokes
(starting five over), all significant. Back nine effects range from 0.06 to 0.16 strokes. The
round-level effects are smaller because effects in the domain of gains cause negative feedback.
When golfers get lucky and play well early in a round, pushing scores below par, prospect
theory forces cause future scores to be higher, causing average scores to be closer to what they
would be under the null.
By comparison, the mean round-level effects found by Brown (2011) and Kali, Pastoriza, and Plante
(2015) were both around 0.2 strokes, and PS’s estimate was 0.25 strokes per round. Our es-
timates are in the same ballpark (somewhat smaller for round effects but larger, per hole, for
half-round effects). Our estimated effects are, however, likely lower bounds, since we impose
the same reference points on all players, whereas we know reference points actually vary de-
pending on expectations. We are essentially measuring players’ reference points with error,
which attenuates our estimated effects. And again, to the extent that the hot/cold hand ef-
fects mitigate prospect theory effects, we are understating the effects of the reference points;
we are (again) just estimating net effects.
7 Conclusion
We provide new evidence that highly experienced agents acting in a high-stakes environment
are influenced by a variety of reference points. The results indicate that the reference points
actually used vary considerably across and within players depending on subjective expectations
and context. When putting, the reference point of par on the current hole is (by far) the
most powerful. Reference points based on past holes are more important for initial shots
on a hole (drives and approaches), and have some influence on putts as well. Past-hole
reference points appear to affect both risk attitudes and effort, with risk effects (greater
conservatism) dominating after small gains, and effort effects dominating as gains grow. There
is some evidence of golfers becoming more risk-seeking after losses, and evidence that overall
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performance worsens as losses grow (the cold hand).
Our results reinforce the conclusion that prospect theory yields insight into behavior be-
yond the standard model. The effects of individual past hole reference points are substantially
smaller than the current-hole reference-point effect on putting found by PS. But past-hole
reference point effects interact within and across holes, and can yield a total effect over a set
of holes of a similar magnitude to that found by PS.
How can we reconcile the differing results–prospect theory effort effects “far” into the
domain of gains, risk effects after small gains, and cold hand effects in the domain of losses?
A careful theoretical analysis is beyond our scope and could be a good topic for future work,
but we provide a few speculative comments here. The variation within the domain of gains is
perhaps relatively straightforward and consistent with Figure 1–the decline in effort after large
gains could be due to the flattening slope of the value function; the steeper, more concave,
value function closer to the reference point may cause the greater conservatism there. An
alternative explanation for the decline in effort is overconfidence due to the hot hand bias.
The cold hand dominance in the domain of losses is more puzzling. This could be due to
a decline in confidence or some other psychological problem greater than the corresponding
increase (if any) in the domain of gains. The cold hand could also be due to lower effort in
the domain of losses, since the value function does flatten far to the left (in the domain of
losses) as well as to the right. Thus, prospect theory and momentum effects may not be in
conflict as much as we initially suggest.
Another potential reason for the cold hand in the domain of losses is that golfers do try
harder (as we initially thought prospect theory predicted), but that greater effort in golf can,
at some point, actually harm performance. See, for example, Cao, Price, and Stone (2011) for
discussion of how too much effort can hurt performance for skill-tasks, i.e. performance can
be an inverse-U shaped function of effort. Perhaps good scores versus reference points push
golfers toward the left end of the hill, and poor scores toward the right end. This would again
mean the cold hand is actually the result of a prospect theory effect, again implying the forces
may cause, rather than compete with, one another.
Last, we note the causality between prospect theory and the cold hand could go in the other
direction as well. The cold hand that occurs when scores go above par may help to rationalize
the emphasis that players put on avoiding a bogey on the current hole found by PS, and the
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conservatism we find after small gains. Similarly, a subconscious attempt to mitigate the hot
hand bias could push players to play more conservatively when in the domain of gains. Hence,
some aspects of prospect theory may actually be adaptive or “ecologically rational” (Smith
(2003)) given psychological factors causing the potential for cold hand momentum.16
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Table 1: Hot hand and prospect theory predictions
Score at start of hole, Prospect Theory: Prospect Theory:
vs reference pt Current hole Hot/cold hand effort risk
Below par Pr(below par) + - -
Below par Pr(above par) - + -
Below par E(score) - + + or 0
Above par Pr(below par) - + +
Above par Pr(above par) + - +
Above par E(score) + - ?
Table 2: Summary statistics for final sample
Round 1 Round 3
Var. Definition Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
bp Dummy for s < 0 0.189 0 1 0.184 0 1
ap Dummy for s > 0 0.175 0 1 0.171 0 1
s Score vs par on current hole 0.006 -3 12 0.006 -3 9
lastb Strokes below par on last hole 0.198 0 3 0.215 0 3
lasta Strokes above par on last hole 0.193 0 12 0.178 0 9
roundb Strokes below par for round at start of current hole 0.793 0 12 0.947 0 11
rounda Strokes above par for round at start of current hole 0.760 0 18 0.606 0 15
tournb Strokes below par for tourn. at start of current hole n/a n/a n/a 3.839 0 27
tourna Strokes above par for tourn. at start of current hole n/a n/a n/a 0.613 0 25
Notes: N = 943575 and 473451 for all variables in rounds 1 and 3, respectively.
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Table 3: Main results
Round 1 Round 3
bp ap s bp ap s
lastb -0.0038*** 0.0008 0.0040** -0.0039*** -0.0031** -0.0005
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0024)
roundb -0.0012*** -0.0002 0.0009 -0.0023*** 0.0008 0.0034***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0009)
tournb -0.0013*** 0.0000 0.0011***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
lasta 0.0004 0.0021** 0.0019 -0.0018 0.0013 0.0037
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0023)
rounda 0.0012*** 0.0013*** 0.0014** 0.0008 0.0004 -0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0011)
tourna -0.0007 0.0015*** 0.0033***
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0008)
Adj R2 0.099 0.052 0.102 0.087 0.048 0.093
N 943575 943575 943575 473451 473451 473451
Notes: All models estimated by OLS with player-year-par and hole-day FEs, and standard errors clustered
by player-tournament. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance.
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Table 4: Quadratics
Round 1 Round 3
bp ap s bp ap s
lastb -0.0037*** 0.0009 0.0040** -0.0038*** -0.0028** -0.0002
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0024)
roundb -0.0015* -0.0017** -0.0008 -0.0029** -0.0016 0.0001
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0019)
roundbsq 0.0001 0.0003* 0.0003 0.0001 0.0005** 0.0007*
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
tournb -0.0019*** 0.0002 0.0019**
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0009)
tournbsq 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
lasta 0.0003 0.0022** 0.0022 -0.0019 0.0014 0.0038
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0023)
rounda 0.0021*** -0.0007 -0.0021* 0.0013 -0.0018 -0.0032
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0022)
roundasq -0.0002 0.0004*** 0.0007*** -0.0002 0.0004* 0.0006
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
tourna -0.0012 0.0028*** 0.0057***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0016)
tournasq 0.0001 -0.0002* -0.0003*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Adj R2 0.099 0.052 0.102 0.087 0.048 0.093
N 943575 943575 943575 473451 473451 473451
Notes: All models estimated by OLS with player-year-par and hole-day FEs, and standard errors clustered
by player-tournament. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance.
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Table 5: Score above/below reference point dummy variables
Round 1 Round 3
bp ap s bp ap s
lastbd -0.0038*** 0.0009 0.0042** -0.0040*** -0.0027* 0.0002
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0025)
roundbd -0.0031*** -0.0023** -0.0001 -0.0070*** -0.0000 0.0060**
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0025)
tournbd -0.0036 -0.0010 0.0017
(0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0040)
lastad 0.0002 0.0023** 0.0027 -0.0009 0.0021 0.0038
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0028)
roundad 0.0024** 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0019 -0.0018 -0.0035
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0028)
tournad -0.0019 0.0055** 0.0103**
(0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0044)
Adj R2 0.099 0.052 0.102 0.086 0.048 0.093
N 943575 943575 943575 473451 473451 473451
Notes: All models estimated by OLS with player-year-par and hole-day FEs, and standard errors clustered
by player-tournament. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance.
Table 6: Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) reference points
Round 1 Round 3
bp ap s bp ap s
adjlastb -0.0038*** 0.0016 0.0053*** -0.0053*** -0.0038** 0.0002
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0029)
adjroundb -0.0014*** -0.0003 0.0010 -0.0025*** 0.0013** 0.0041***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0010)
adjtournb -0.0015*** 0.0002 0.0013***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
adjlasta 0.0003 0.0026** 0.0029 -0.0026* 0.0006 0.0037
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0025)
adjrounda 0.0012*** 0.0013*** 0.0015** 0.0006 0.0011* 0.0009
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0011)
adjtourna -0.0014*** 0.0021*** 0.0043***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0009)
Adj R2 0.099 0.052 0.102 0.087 0.048 0.093
N 943575 943575 943575 473451 473451 473451
Notes: All models estimated by OLS with player-year-par and hole-day FEs, and standard errors clustered
by player-tournament. See text for definition of adj variables. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance.
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Table 7: Front nine/back nine
Round 1 Round 3
bp ap s bp ap s
Front nine
lastb -0.0026 0.0013 0.0041 -0.0044** -0.0026 0.0007
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0037)
roundb -0.0034*** 0.0001 0.0028** -0.0043*** -0.0009 0.0035*
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0020)
tournb -0.0015*** 0.0004 0.0019***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007)
lasta 0.0007 0.0033** 0.0032 -0.0002 0.0013 0.0007
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0037)
rounda 0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0008 0.0007 -0.0030** -0.0040*
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0022)
tourna -0.0001 0.0015* 0.0024*
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0014)
Adj R2 0.100 0.051 0.103 0.087 0.049 0.095
N 443410 443410 443410 221447 221447 221447
Back nine
lastb -0.0062*** 0.0007 0.0061** -0.0057*** -0.0026 0.0014
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0033)
roundb -0.0011** -0.0003 0.0008 -0.0008 0.0002 0.0010
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0011)
tournb -0.0015*** 0.0002 0.0014**
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006)
lasta 0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0016 -0.0028 -0.0012 0.0023
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0022) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0032)
rounda 0.0006 0.0027*** 0.0039*** 0.0003 0.0022*** 0.0022
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0014)
tourna -0.0005 0.0011* 0.0029***
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0011)
Adj R2 0.101 0.052 0.104 0.088 0.047 0.092
N 500165 500165 500165 252004 252004 252004
Notes: All models estimated by OLS with player-year-par and hole-day FEs, and standard errors clustered
by player-tournament. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance.
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Table 8: Par 3/4/5
Round 1 Round 3
bp ap s bp ap s
Par 3
lastb -0.0026 0.0048** 0.0058* -0.0035 -0.0058* -0.0043
(0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0033) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0048)
roundb -0.0008 -0.0005 0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0010 -0.0001
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0018)
tournb -0.0022*** 0.0009* 0.0027***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008)
lasta 0.0018 0.0061*** 0.0047 -0.0003 -0.0037 -0.0032
(0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0032) (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0048)
rounda 0.0010 0.0014* 0.0024* -0.0003 0.0023 0.0028
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0023)
tourna 0.0011 0.0006 0.0006
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0018)
Adj R2 0.024 0.039 0.049 0.026 0.038 0.049
N 216353 216353 216353 99016 99016 99016
Par 4
lastb -0.0033** -0.0001 0.0028 -0.0044*** -0.0026 0.0007
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0029)
roundb -0.0011** -0.0001 0.0009 -0.0028*** 0.0012* 0.0040***
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0011)
tournb -0.0008*** -0.0002 0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005)
lasta 0.0004 0.0011 0.0007 -0.0014 0.0019 0.0044
(0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0021) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0028)
rounda 0.0009** 0.0012** 0.0014* 0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0014
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0013)
tourna -0.0009* 0.0015*** 0.0034***
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0009)
Adj R2 0.041 0.049 0.066 0.048 0.047 0.070
N 577792 577792 577792 332538 332538 332538
Par 5
lastb -0.0082** -0.0024 0.0064 -0.0007 0.0002 -0.0007
(0.0036) (0.0022) (0.0051) (0.0067) (0.0039) (0.0097)
roundb -0.0020* -0.0004 0.0018 -0.0028 0.0016 0.0073**
(0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0017) (0.0024) (0.0014) (0.0034)
tournb -0.0032*** 0.0000 0.0031**
(0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0015)
lasta -0.0015 0.0003 0.0028 -0.0084 0.0079** 0.0136
(0.0028) (0.0018) (0.0042) (0.0057) (0.0037) (0.0084)
rounda 0.0028*** 0.0018** -0.0001 0.0006 0.0016 0.0028
(0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0016) (0.0026) (0.0017) (0.0039)
tourna -0.0033 0.0040*** 0.0095***
(0.0020) (0.0014) (0.0031)
Adj R2 0.074 0.027 0.074 0.074 0.029 0.074
N 149430 149430 149430 41897 41897 41897
Notes: All models estimated by OLS with player-year-par and hole-day FEs, and standard errors clustered by
player-tournament. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance.
32
Table 9: Player rank
Round 1 Round 3
bp ap s bp ap s
Rank < 200
lastb -0.0027* -0.0011 0.0013 -0.0045** -0.0036** -0.0016
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0025) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0031)
roundb -0.0011** -0.0006 0.0002 -0.0016** 0.0013* 0.0034***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0012)
tournb -0.0012*** -0.0004 0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005)
lasta 0.0014 0.0023* 0.0014 0.0001 0.0013 0.0013
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0030)
rounda 0.0007 0.0011** 0.0013 0.0011 0.0006 -0.0002
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0015)
tourna -0.0011** 0.0016*** 0.0034***
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0010)
Adj R2 0.102 0.049 0.103 0.091 0.044 0.093
N 466410 466410 466410 288930 288930 288930
Rank ≥ 200
lastb -0.0047*** 0.0029* 0.0066*** -0.0030 -0.0027 0.0010
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0040)
roundb -0.0014*** 0.0001 0.0018* -0.0036*** -0.0001 0.0034**
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0015)
tournb -0.0016*** 0.0011** 0.0028***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007)
lasta -0.0008 0.0021 0.0029 -0.0048** 0.0019 0.0078**
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0038)
rounda 0.0017*** 0.0013*** 0.0012 0.0005 0.0006 0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0018)
tourna -0.0004 0.0010 0.0033**
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0014)
Adj R2 0.097 0.053 0.100 0.083 0.049 0.091
N 477165 477165 477165 184521 184521 184521
Notes: All models estimated by OLS with player-year-par and hole-day FEs, and standard errors clustered
by player-tournament. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance.
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Table 10: Drives/approaches/putts
Drive Fairway Distance Approach Approach Make putt
distance (0/1) after approach close (0/1) far (0/1) (0/1)
Round 1
lastb -0.0921 -0.0025 1.8758* -0.0036* 0.0021 -0.0009
(0.0575) (0.0016) (1.0523) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0007)
roundb 0.0623*** -0.0014*** 0.0710 -0.0013* 0.0003 -0.0011***
(0.0214) (0.0005) (0.3748) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0002)
lasta 0.0465 -0.0019 -0.4200 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0005
(0.0500) (0.0013) (0.9568) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0006)
rounda 0.1660*** -0.0006 0.2675 0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0002
(0.0203) (0.0005) (0.3764) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0002)
R2 0.554 0.065 0.131 0.078 0.112 0.603
N 683906 683906 327089 327089 327089 1430394
Round 3
lastb -0.1708** 0.0018 1.1477 -0.0021 0.0000 0.0010
(0.0731) (0.0020) (1.2882) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0009)
roundb -0.2246*** 0.0014* 1.5876*** -0.0033*** 0.0033*** -0.0005
(0.0301) (0.0007) (0.4868) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0003)
tournb 0.1582*** -0.0011*** 0.5946*** -0.0011** 0.0017*** -0.0011***
(0.0144) (0.0003) (0.2205) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0002)
lasta 0.1608** -0.0011 3.0356** -0.0063** 0.0034 -0.0015*
(0.0686) (0.0018) (1.2737) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0008)
rounda 0.2674*** -0.0015* -1.1888** 0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0001
(0.0347) (0.0008) (0.6000) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0004)
tourna -0.1162*** -0.0005 0.7779* -0.0009 0.0012 0.0005
(0.0282) (0.0006) (0.4525) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0003)
R2 0.580 0.071 0.143 0.083 0.113 0.613
N 396249 396249 191519 191519 191519 820068
Notes: All models estimated by OLS with player-year-par and hole-day FEs, and standard errors clustered
by player-tournament. See text for other controls. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance.
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Table 11: Additional analysis of drives (round 3 only)
LHS = Distance LHS = Fairway (0/1)
lastb -0.1506* -0.2267** -0.2116*** 0.0023 0.0001 0.0021
(0.0768) (0.0896) (0.0770) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0021)
roundb -0.2190*** -0.2339*** -0.2191*** 0.0016** 0.0015 0.0016**
(0.0316) (0.0370) (0.0304) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008)
tournb 0.1415*** 0.1449*** 0.1322*** -0.0012*** -0.0013*** -0.0011***
(0.0151) (0.0172) (0.0144) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
lasta 0.1630** 0.2699*** 0.2162*** -0.0008 0.0027 -0.0005
(0.0728) (0.0916) (0.0731) (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0019)
rounda 0.2691*** 0.2673*** 0.2709*** -0.0024*** -0.0029*** -0.0023**
(0.0365) (0.0421) (0.0351) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0009)
tourna -0.1025*** -0.1116*** -0.0961*** -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0004









Adj R2 0.577 0.588 0.578 0.071 0.070 0.071
N 356728 245341 356104 356728 245341 356104
Notes: All models estimated by OLS with player-year-par and hole-day FEs, and standard errors clustered
by player-tournament. See text for other controls. *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance.
Table 12: Joint reference point effects for sets of holes (point estimate, 95% confidence interval)
Full Round Back 9, roundb = 5 (at start) Back 9, rounda = 5
Round 1 0.033, [0.006, 0.057] 0.044, [-0.014, 0.099] 0.104, [0.051, 0.157]
Rd 3, tsb = 5 (at start) 0.169, [0.111, 0.226] 0.128, [0.057, 0.203] 0.166, [0.049, 0.281]
Rd 3, tsb = tsa = 0 0.088, [0.054, 0.119] 0.057, [-0.017, 0.129] 0.104, [0.015, 0.204]
Rd 3, tsa = 5 0.231, [0.133, 0.33] 0.123, [0.006, 0.241] 0.164, [0.078, 0.252]
Notes: Table reports expected score for round or half-round (estimated by simulation procedure explained in
text) with reference point effects minus expected score under null hypothesis of i.i.d. hole scores. last vars =
0 at start of each back nine.
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A Appendix tables
All tables report results from OLS regressions with hole-day FEs and standard errors clustered
by player-tournament.
Table 1: Player-course vs player-year-par FEs; LHS variable = bp; Round 1 only
Player-course FEs Round 1 Round 3
#Obs per FE group: > 0 > 50 > 100 > 0 > 50 > 100
lastb -0.0165*** -0.0102*** -0.0083*** -0.0151*** -0.0097*** -0.0115***
(0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0019) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0032)
roundb -0.0152*** -0.0066*** -0.0026*** -0.0212*** -0.0077*** -0.0033***
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0012)
tournb -0.0016*** -0.0012*** -0.0014***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005)
lasta -0.0073*** -0.0026** -0.0005 -0.0115*** -0.0043*** -0.0025
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0030)
rounda 0.0089*** 0.0030*** 0.0021*** 0.0124*** 0.0043*** 0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0015)
tourna -0.0015*** -0.0013** 0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0010)
Adj R2 0.104 0.100 0.100 0.114 0.109 0.104
N 1072649 654653 276012 628133 323391 103496
Player-year-par FEs Round 1 Round 3
#Obs per FE group: > 0 > 50 > 100 > 0 > 50 > 100
lastb -0.0039*** -0.0038*** -0.0029** -0.0018 -0.0039*** -0.0034*
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0018)
roundb -0.0018*** -0.0012*** -0.0014*** -0.0035*** -0.0023*** -0.0025***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007)
tournb -0.0010*** -0.0013*** -0.0008***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
lasta -0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 -0.0023** -0.0018 -0.0013
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0017)
rounda 0.0024*** 0.0012*** 0.0009** 0.0015*** 0.0008 0.0009
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0008)
tourna -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0007
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006)
Adj R2 0.103 0.099 0.045 0.112 0.087 0.049
N 1072649 943575 648089 628133 473451 284290
Table 2: Player-year-par FE groups
Round 1 Round 3
bp ap s bp ap s
> 50 obs per group
lastb -0.0038*** 0.0008 0.0040** -0.0039*** -0.0031** -0.0005
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0024)
lasta 0.0004 0.0021** 0.0019 -0.0018 0.0013 0.0037
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0023)
roundb -0.0012*** -0.0002 0.0009 -0.0023*** 0.0008 0.0034***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0009)
rounda 0.0012*** 0.0013*** 0.0014** 0.0008 0.0004 -0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0011)
tournb -0.0013*** 0.0000 0.0011***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
tourna -0.0007 0.0015*** 0.0033***
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0008)
R2 0.099 0.052 0.102 0.087 0.048 0.093
N 943575 943575 943575 473451 473451 473451
> 75
lastb -0.0035*** 0.0009 0.0035* -0.0047*** -0.0024 0.0009
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0028)
lasta 0.0009 0.0021** 0.0012 -0.0009 0.0007 0.0024
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0028)
roundb -0.0011*** -0.0003 0.0006 -0.0021*** 0.0010 0.0031***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0011)
rounda 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013** 0.0007 0.0000 -0.0006
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0013)
tournb -0.0011*** -0.0002 0.0006
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005)
tourna -0.0007 0.0017*** 0.0034***
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0009)
R2 0.079 0.049 0.087 0.047 0.046 0.068
N 819274 819274 819274 341126 341126 341126
> 100
lastb -0.0029** 0.0002 0.0022 -0.0034* -0.0027 -0.0008
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0031)
lasta 0.0003 0.0018 0.0013 -0.0013 0.0012 0.0036
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0030)
roundb -0.0014*** -0.0003 0.0010 -0.0025*** 0.0012* 0.0037***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0012)
rounda 0.0009** 0.0013*** 0.0018** 0.0009 0.0005 -0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0014)
tournb -0.0008*** -0.0002 0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005)
tourna -0.0007 0.0017*** 0.0033***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0010)
R2 0.045 0.047 0.066 0.049 0.045 0.069
N 647916 647916 647916 284021 284021 284021
Table 3: Player-year groups
Round 1 Round 3
bp ap s bp ap s
> 50 obs per group
lastb -0.0060*** 0.0007 0.0062*** -0.0046*** -0.0028** 0.0004
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0022)
lasta 0.0000 0.0013 0.0013 -0.0020* 0.0011 0.0035*
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0021)
roundb -0.0015*** 0.0000 0.0015*** -0.0032*** 0.0010** 0.0045***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008)
rounda 0.0015*** 0.0011*** 0.0008 0.0008 0.0001 -0.0009
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0010)
tournb -0.0011*** 0.0000 0.0008**
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
tourna -0.0004 0.0013*** 0.0030***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007)
R2 0.102 0.052 0.105 0.110 0.051 0.110
N 1019320 1019320 1019320 602429 602429 602429
> 100
lastb -0.0056*** 0.0007 0.0059*** -0.0048*** -0.0027** 0.0009
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0022)
lasta 0.0001 0.0012 0.0011 -0.0017 0.0006 0.0027
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0021)
roundb -0.0014*** -0.0000 0.0013** -0.0028*** 0.0006 0.0037***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008)
rounda 0.0013*** 0.0014*** 0.0015** 0.0006 0.0004 -0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0010)
tournb -0.0012*** 0.0000 0.0009**
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
tourna -0.0006 0.0014*** 0.0032***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007)
R2 0.102 0.052 0.105 0.110 0.051 0.110
N 989757 989757 989757 571693 571693 571693
> 150
lastb -0.0053*** 0.0006 0.0053*** -0.0047*** -0.0026** 0.0006
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0023)
lasta 0.0002 0.0012 0.0009 -0.0016 0.0004 0.0020
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0022)
roundb -0.0014*** -0.0001 0.0013** -0.0025*** 0.0006 0.0034***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0009)
rounda 0.0012*** 0.0015*** 0.0017*** 0.0007 0.0005 -0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0011)
tournb -0.0011*** 0.0001 0.0009**
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
tourna -0.0005 0.0017*** 0.0034***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008)
R2 0.102 0.052 0.105 0.111 0.050 0.110
N 961010 961010 961010 525912 525912 525912
Table 4: Player-year groups continued
Round 1 Round 3
bp ap s bp ap s
> 200
lastb -0.0052*** 0.0006 0.0051*** -0.0035** -0.0028** -0.0004
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0025)
lasta 0.0002 0.0013 0.0011 -0.0020 0.0004 0.0027
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0024)
roundb -0.0013*** -0.0002 0.0011* -0.0025*** 0.0003 0.0030***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0009)
rounda 0.0013*** 0.0014*** 0.0016** 0.0004 0.0007 0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0012)
tournb -0.0013*** 0.0001 0.0011***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
tourna -0.0003 0.0018*** 0.0033***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008)
R2 0.103 0.052 0.105 0.111 0.050 0.111
N 926092 926092 926092 452336 452336 452336
> 300
lastb -0.0049*** 0.0004 0.0045** -0.0038 -0.0006 0.0024
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0041)
lasta 0.0000 0.0012 0.0012 0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0010
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0041)
roundb -0.0014*** -0.0001 0.0013** -0.0010 -0.0008 0.0008
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0016)
rounda 0.0013*** 0.0015*** 0.0015** 0.0003 0.0020* 0.0025
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0020)
tournb -0.0025*** 0.0007* 0.0029***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007)
tourna -0.0016* 0.0002 0.0029*
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0015)
R2 0.103 0.052 0.105 0.115 0.048 0.111
N 801278 801278 801278 166535 166535 166535
> 400
lastb -0.0060*** 0.0015 0.0066*** -0.0006 -0.0234 -0.0231
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0025) (0.0218) (0.0209) (0.0359)
lasta 0.0006 0.0015 0.0005 -0.0213 -0.0143 -0.0020
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0023) (0.0167) (0.0176) (0.0279)
roundb -0.0020*** -0.0003 0.0014 -0.0020 0.0074 0.0109
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0091) (0.0081) (0.0154)
rounda 0.0013*** 0.0009* 0.0006 -0.0075 0.0053 0.0084
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0089) (0.0110) (0.0191)
tournb -0.0050 0.0012 0.0050
(0.0039) (0.0035) (0.0066)
tourna 0.0071 -0.0027 -0.0073
(0.0063) (0.0071) (0.0107)
R2 0.104 0.051 0.105 0.124 0.026 0.101
N 486502 486502 486502 3395 3395 3395
Table 5: Player-year groups and player-par groups
Round 1 Round 3
bp ap s bp ap s
> 50 obs per p-y group
lastb -0.0054*** 0.0007 0.0056*** -0.0038*** -0.0028** -0.0004
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0022)
lasta 0.0001 0.0015* 0.0016 -0.0019 0.0014 0.0038*
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0021)
roundb -0.0015*** 0.0000 0.0015** -0.0031*** 0.0010** 0.0045***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008)
rounda 0.0015*** 0.0011*** 0.0008 0.0008 0.0001 -0.0009
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0010)
tournb -0.0011*** 0.0000 0.0008**
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
tourna -0.0004 0.0013*** 0.0030***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007)
R2 0.103 0.053 0.105 0.111 0.051 0.110
N 1019320 1019320 1019320 602429 602429 602429
> 100
lastb -0.0051*** 0.0007 0.0053*** -0.0040*** -0.0027** 0.0000
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0022)
lasta 0.0002 0.0014 0.0013 -0.0017 0.0009 0.0030
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0021)
roundb -0.0014*** -0.0000 0.0013** -0.0027*** 0.0006 0.0037***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008)
rounda 0.0013*** 0.0014*** 0.0015** 0.0006 0.0004 -0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0010)
tournb -0.0012*** 0.0000 0.0009**
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
tourna -0.0006 0.0014*** 0.0032***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007)
R2 0.103 0.052 0.106 0.111 0.051 0.110
N 989757 989757 989757 571693 571693 571693
> 150
lastb -0.0048*** 0.0006 0.0047*** -0.0040*** -0.0027** -0.0002
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0023)
lasta 0.0003 0.0014 0.0011 -0.0016 0.0006 0.0024
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0022)
roundb -0.0013*** -0.0001 0.0012** -0.0024*** 0.0006 0.0034***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0009)
rounda 0.0012*** 0.0015*** 0.0017*** 0.0007 0.0005 -0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0011)
tournb -0.0011*** 0.0001 0.0009**
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
tourna -0.0005 0.0017*** 0.0034***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008)
R2 0.103 0.052 0.106 0.112 0.050 0.110
N 961010 961010 961010 525912 525912 525912
Table 6: Player-year groups and player-par groups, continued
Round 1 Round 3
bp ap s bp ap s
> 200
lastb -0.0046*** 0.0006 0.0045** -0.0029* -0.0029** -0.0011
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0025)
lasta 0.0003 0.0015 0.0013 -0.0020 0.0007 0.0030
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0024)
roundb -0.0013*** -0.0002 0.0011* -0.0024*** 0.0003 0.0029***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0009)
rounda 0.0013*** 0.0014*** 0.0016** 0.0004 0.0007 0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0012)
tournb -0.0013*** 0.0001 0.0011***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
tourna -0.0003 0.0018*** 0.0034***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008)
R2 0.104 0.052 0.106 0.112 0.050 0.111
N 926092 926092 926092 452336 452336 452336
> 300
lastb -0.0044*** 0.0003 0.0039** -0.0033 -0.0004 0.0020
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0041)
lasta 0.0001 0.0014 0.0014 0.0008 0.0001 -0.0006
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0041)
roundb -0.0014*** -0.0001 0.0013* -0.0009 -0.0008 0.0007
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0016)
rounda 0.0013*** 0.0015*** 0.0015** 0.0003 0.0021* 0.0026
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0020)
tournb -0.0025*** 0.0007* 0.0029***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007)
tourna -0.0017* 0.0002 0.0029*
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0015)
R2 0.104 0.052 0.106 0.116 0.047 0.112
N 801278 801278 801278 166535 166535 166535
> 400
lastb -0.0054*** 0.0015 0.0060** -0.0009 -0.0226 -0.0220
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0025) (0.0222) (0.0209) (0.0358)
lasta 0.0007 0.0018 0.0006 -0.0202 -0.0143 -0.0031
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0023) (0.0166) (0.0177) (0.0278)
roundb -0.0020*** -0.0004 0.0013 -0.0016 0.0075 0.0107
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0090) (0.0080) (0.0153)
rounda 0.0013*** 0.0009* 0.0006 -0.0076 0.0056 0.0092
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0089) (0.0110) (0.0189)
tournb -0.0051 0.0013 0.0050
(0.0039) (0.0035) (0.0066)
tourna 0.0072 -0.0029 -0.0077
(0.0063) (0.0071) (0.0107)
R2 0.105 0.051 0.106 0.124 0.026 0.102
N 486502 486502 486502 3395 3395 3395
Table 7: Player-year-par groups with > 50 obs with different maxes for hole-day group obs
Round 1 Round 3
bp ap s bp ap s
Full sample
lastb -0.0038*** 0.0008 0.0040** -0.0039*** -0.0031** -0.0005
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0024)
lasta 0.0004 0.0021** 0.0019 -0.0018 0.0013 0.0037
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0023)
roundb -0.0012*** -0.0002 0.0009 -0.0023*** 0.0008 0.0034***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0009)
rounda 0.0012*** 0.0013*** 0.0014** 0.0008 0.0004 -0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0011)
tournb -0.0013*** 0.0000 0.0011***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
tourna -0.0007 0.0015*** 0.0033***
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0008)
R2 0.099 0.052 0.102 0.087 0.048 0.093
N 943575 943575 943575 473451 473451 473451
< 60 obs per hole-day group
lastb -0.0033** 0.0003 0.0030 -0.0034** -0.0018 0.0006
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0027)
lasta 0.0013 0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0023 0.0016 0.0047*
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0023) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0026)
roundb -0.0015*** -0.0003 0.0010 -0.0027*** 0.0008 0.0037***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0010)
rounda 0.0007 0.0012** 0.0015* 0.0008 0.0011 0.0006
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0012)
tournb -0.0012*** 0.0000 0.0009**
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005)
tourna -0.0008* 0.0013** 0.0030***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0009)
R2 0.103 0.054 0.106 0.088 0.048 0.094
N 492782 492782 492782 380990 380990 380990
< 40
lastb -0.0051*** 0.0011 0.0055* -0.0018 -0.0030 -0.0022
(0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0032)
lasta 0.0022 -0.0004 -0.0024 -0.0023 0.0024 0.0058*
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0028) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0032)
roundb -0.0020*** -0.0008 0.0009 -0.0028*** 0.0008 0.0040***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0012)
rounda 0.0011** 0.0013** 0.0011 0.0008 0.0012 0.0011
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0015)
tournb -0.0011*** -0.0001 0.0008
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005)
tourna -0.0008 0.0012* 0.0031***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0010)
R2 0.106 0.054 0.108 0.089 0.047 0.095
N 339886 339886 339886 265958 265958 265958
Table 8: First/middle/last thirds of rounds 1 and 3 (player-year-par groups with > 50 obs)
Round 1 Round 3
bp ap s bp ap s
Holes 1-6
lastb -0.0055** 0.0009 0.0063* -0.0063** -0.0042 0.0020
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0037) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0050)
lasta 0.0026 0.0015 -0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 -0.0015
(0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0034) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0051)
roundb -0.0040*** -0.0010 0.0022 -0.0061*** 0.0026 0.0087***
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0032)
rounda 0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0017 0.0002 -0.0028 -0.0035
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0036)
tournb -0.0018*** 0.0005 0.0023***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008)
tourna -0.0006 0.0022** 0.0041**
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0018)
R2 0.099 0.050 0.101 0.088 0.049 0.096
N 277641 277641 277641 138999 138999 138999
Holes 7-12
lastb -0.0043** -0.0001 0.0038 -0.0066*** -0.0010 0.0026
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0030) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0040)
lasta -0.0018 0.0006 0.0010 -0.0023 -0.0033 -0.0030
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0039)
roundb -0.0011* 0.0007 0.0019* -0.0009 -0.0027*** -0.0017
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0017)
rounda 0.0006 0.0010 0.0017 0.0017 -0.0001 -0.0012
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0020)
tournb -0.0014*** 0.0007 0.0019**
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0007)
tourna -0.0015* 0.0015* 0.0041***
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0015)
R2 0.099 0.051 0.104 0.081 0.045 0.088
N 332875 332875 332875 167811 167811 167811
Holes 13-18
lastb -0.0074*** 0.0025 0.0090*** -0.0083*** -0.0034 0.0043
(0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0030) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0042)
lasta 0.0012 -0.0019 -0.0034 -0.0016 -0.0042* -0.0022
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0039)
roundb -0.0012** -0.0007 0.0004 -0.0010 0.0007 0.0015
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0014)
rounda 0.0004 0.0033*** 0.0048*** -0.0010 0.0030*** 0.0044***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0016)
tournb -0.0014*** -0.0002 0.0009
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007)
tourna 0.0008 0.0007 0.0011
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0014)
R2 0.104 0.052 0.105 0.094 0.048 0.096
N 333059 333059 333059 166637 166637 166637
Table 9: First/middle/last thirds of rounds 2 and 4 (player-year-par groups with > 50 obs)
Round 2 Round 4
bp ap s bp ap s
Holes 1-6
lastb -0.0025 -0.0037* 0.0001 -0.0017 -0.0021 -0.0030
(0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0037) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0053)
lasta -0.0009 -0.0017 0.0006 0.0003 -0.0021 -0.0009
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0035) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0053)
roundb -0.0071*** 0.0012 0.0069*** -0.0072*** 0.0043** 0.0113***
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0033)
rounda 0.0017 -0.0012 -0.0045* -0.0001 0.0028 0.0022
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0035)
tournb -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0010** 0.0002 0.0006
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007)
tourna 0.0002 0.0021*** 0.0029*** -0.0015** 0.0029*** 0.0062***
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0013)
R2 0.099 0.049 0.101 0.087 0.047 0.090
N 271011 271011 271011 127204 127204 127204
Holes 7-12
lastb -0.0019 -0.0015 0.0003 -0.0081*** -0.0032 0.0041
(0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0043)
lasta -0.0025 0.0011 0.0041 -0.0019 -0.0011 -0.0000
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0043)
roundb -0.0028*** -0.0000 0.0022* -0.0040*** 0.0012 0.0051***
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0017)
rounda -0.0008 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0010 0.0021* 0.0038**
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0018)
tournb -0.0008** -0.0000 0.0005 -0.0008** -0.0002 0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006)
tourna 0.0004 0.0031*** 0.0043*** -0.0002 0.0018*** 0.0024**
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0011)
R2 0.103 0.049 0.103 0.082 0.050 0.092
N 325274 325274 325274 153116 153116 153116
Holes 13-18
lastb -0.0068*** -0.0022 0.0025 -0.0066*** -0.0061** -0.0029
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0046)
lasta -0.0002 0.0006 0.0024 0.0049** -0.0063*** -0.0121***
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0040)
roundb -0.0006 0.0006 0.0012 -0.0001 0.0010 0.0010
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0014)
rounda -0.0001 0.0008 0.0012 0.0001 0.0002 0.0010
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0015)
tournb -0.0004 -0.0011*** -0.0018*** -0.0007** -0.0003 -0.0000
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006)
tourna 0.0004 0.0037*** 0.0052*** 0.0009* 0.0012* 0.0008
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0011)
R2 0.108 0.052 0.107 0.099 0.052 0.099
N 325131 325131 325131 151540 151540 151540
